| 摘要: |
| 目的 为了有效推动我国畜禽养殖粪污治理，促进农业的可持续发展。方法 文章基于组织行为视角，采用演化博弈的方法，构建畜禽粪污治理中养殖企业、第三方治理公司和地方政府的三方演化博弈模型，依据“无过错责任原则”，对养殖企业与第三方治理公司的责任进行界定，并引入奖惩分配机制，通过求解三方复制动态方程均衡点，对各主体的渐进式稳定条件进行了分析，运用MATLAB软件仿真了相关参数对系统稳定性的影响。结果 奖惩力度、奖惩分配系数以及声誉收益的提高均对养殖企业和第三方治理公司的行为产生正向影响，且养殖企业较第三方治理公司表现出更强的收益敏感性，上级政府的政策支持和行政问责力度的增大以及地方政府监管成本的降低均可以有效避免地方政府监管缺位现象的发生。结论 建议落实养殖企业和第三方治理公司的主体责任，设置合理的奖惩力度和分配系数。 |
| 关键词: 奖惩分配机制 畜禽粪污 第三方治理 演化博弈 无过错责任原则 |
| DOI：10.7621/cjarrp.1005-9121.20240120 |
| 分类号:F224.32;X713 |
| 基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目“生猪规模养殖企业环境行为演化反馈机理分析与优化政策设计”（71764016）；安徽省哲学社会科学规划项目“产业链协同发展视角下农业废弃物资源化利用补贴方案研究”（AHSKQ2020D28）；安徽省高校社会科学研究项目“高质量发展视角下农业废弃物资源化利用产业链动力机制研究”（SK202120） |
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| EVOLUTIONARY GAME ANALYSIS ON THE THIRD-PARTY TREATMENT OF LIVESTOCK AND POULTRY MANURE WITH CONSIDERATION OF REWARD AND PUNISHMENT DISTRIBUTION MECHANISM——BASED ON “NO FAULT LIABILITY PRINCIPLE” |
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Zhang Hao, Hu Zikun, Zhuang Daoyuan
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School of Economics and Management, Huaibei Normal University, Huaibei 235000, Anhui, China
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| Abstract: |
| To effectively promote the treatment of livestock and poultry manure and promote the sustainable development of agriculture in China. Based on the perspective of organizational behavior, the evolutionary game method was adopted to build a tripartite evolutionary game model of breeding enterprises, third-party governance companies and local governments in livestock and poultry manure treatment. According to the "no fault liability principle", the responsibilities of breeding enterprises and third-party governance companies were defined, and the reward and punishment distribution mechanism was introduced. And by solving the equilibrium point of the tripartite replication dynamic equation, the progressive stability conditions of each subject were analyzed, then MATLAB software was used to simulate the influence of relevant parameters on system stability. The results showed that the strength of rewards and punishment, the distribution coefficient of rewards and punishment, and the improvement of reputation income had a positive impact on the behavior of breeding enterprises and third-party governance companies, and breeding enterprises showed stronger income sensitivity than third-party governance companies. And the increase of policy support and administrative accountability of the superior government and the reduction of local government supervision costs could effectively prevent the occurrence of local government supervision vacancies. Therefore, it is suggested to implement the main responsibilities of breeding enterprises and third-party governance companies, and set reasonable rewards and punishments and distribution coefficients. |
| Key words: reward and punishment distribution mechanism livestock manure third-party governance evolutionary game principle of no fault liability |
