| 摘要: |
| 目的 在当前化肥施用过量并造成严重面源污染的背景下，需要厘清农户化肥减量行为困境并进行合理的机制设计，实现化肥施用量“负增长”的目标。方法 文章引入农户从众性行为、政府内源激励、外源激励，构建农户化肥减量行为动力机制理论模型，并通过演化博弈理论和结构方程模型进行理论和实证分析。结果 减量内生动力，农户从众性行为、减量禀赋间接正向影响减量行为，减量意向具有中介效应；减量外生动力，政府内源激励直接正向影响减量行为，外源激励在减量意向与减量行为之间发挥积极调节作用；仅在政府提供双向激励，策略（双向激励—化肥减量）才能演化为稳定状态。结论 增强农户减量内生动力，完善基层农业技术推广体系建设和建设标准化果园，充分发挥减量外生动力，加大政府对化肥减量增效技术的宣传教育，尽快落实生态补偿等减量政策。 |
| 关键词: 化肥减量 从众性行为 双向激励 演化博弈 结构方程 |
| DOI：10.7621/cjarrp.1005-9121.20220116 |
| 分类号:F323 |
| 基金项目:山东省“双一流”奖补资金(SYL2017XTTD08)；山东农业大学社科研究发展基金“山东省农业资源与生态安全研究”（201712—03） |
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| RESEARCH ON THE DYNAMIC MECHANISM OF FARMERS' FERTILIZER REDUCTION BEHAVIORBASED ON THE SURVEY OF APPLE GROWERS IN YUNCHENG AREA, SHANXI PROVINCE |
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Li Shuqiang, Ge Yanxiang
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山东农业大学经管学院，泰安 271018
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| Abstract: |
| Under the current background of the excessive fertilizer application and the severe non-point source pollution, it is necessary to clarify the dilemma of the farmers' fertilizer reduction behavior and make reasonable mechanism design to achieve the goal of "negative growth" in fertilizer application. By means of introducing farmers' conformity behavior as well as the government's internal and external incentives, the theoretical model of the dynamic mechanism of farmers' fertilizer reduction behavior was established, and the theoretical and empirical analysis was carried out through the Evolutionary Game Theory and the structural equation model. The results were indicated as follows. The endogenous power of fertilizer reduction, the farmers' conformity behavior, and the endowment of fertilizer reduction had indirect positive influence on the behavior of fertilizer reduction, and the intention of fertilizer reduction possessed the mediating effect; the exogenous power of fertilizer reduction and the government's internal incentive had a direct positive influence on fertilizer reduction behavior, and the external incentive played a positive regulating role between reduction intention and reduction behavior. Only when the government provided a two-way incentive can the strategy (two-way incentive - fertilizer reduction) evolve into a stable state. Therefore, we should strengthen the endogenous power of farmers' fertilizer reduction, perfect the construction of agricultural technology popularization system and build standardized orchards, give full play to the exogenous power of fertilizer reduction, increase the publicity and education on the technology of the fertilizer reduction and efficiency enhancement, and implement the reduction policy such as ecological compensation as soon as possible. |
| Key words: fertilizer reduction conformity behavior two-way incentive evolutionary game structural equation |
